"Giving an unusually fair and sympathetic portrayal of the views that compete with her own, Laura Ekstrom has carved out and defended a particularly attractive version of incompatibilism. The book is very nicely written, covering some rather esoteric material without sacrificing charm or clarity. In addition, it shows an exceptional appreciation of the complexity and variety of the interwoven issues that factor into an analysis of free will� Both stimulating and informative, it is a pleasure to read."

--Susan Wolf, Johns Hopkins University

"This is an excellent, well-conceived text (in scope and order of presentation) on the cluster of problems falling under the heading of free will...[Ekstrom] evinces a full mastery of the relevant contemporary work on each of the specific topics she addresses. Her own views are controversial (as are all views in this area), yet not without prominent support in their general outlines. She deals with opposing views in an evenhanded and largely unpolemical manner. The distinctive twists she puts on familiar approaches to these topics are an attempt to steer a middle path between problematic positions in the literature. Such pleasing syntheses will engage professional theorists and at the same time provide a good model for students of how one should try to reconcile opposing tendencies in our thinking about these topics."

--Timothy O'Connor, Indiana University

"Ekstrom shows good judgment about the issues, arguments, and authors that require attention...The presentation is accurate and accessible...Ekstrom's own brand of libertarianism is a significant contribution to the literature."

--Alfred Mele, Davidson College

"A significant, much discussed book...Ekstrom is aiming at an account which is an alternative to theories of agent causation but which shares many of the virtues of accounts of free will in terms of agent causation. In my view, Ekstrom's attempts to provide such an alternative account are creative and innovative. Her criticisms of alternative accounts are also insightful and move the discussion forward. For both these reasons, I think that her book will receive much favorable attention."

--Eleonore Stump, Saint Louis University

Perseus Books Group Web Site, Aug., 2001

In this comprehensive new study of human free agency, Laura Waddell Ekstrom critically surveys contemporary philosophical literature and provides a novel account of the conditions for free action. Ekstrom argues that incompatibilism concerning free will and causal determinism is true and thus the right account of the nature of free action must be indeterminist in nature. She examines a variety of libertarian approaches, ultimately defending an account relying on indeterministic causation among events and appealing to agent causation only in a reducible sense.Written in an engaging style and incorporating recent scholarship, this study is critical reading for scholars and students interested in the topics of motivation, causation, responsibility, and freedom. In broadly covering the important positions of others along with its exposition of the author's own view, Free Will provides both a significant scholarly contribution and a valuable text for courses in metaphysics and action theory.

Preface
The Problem of Human Freedom

Skepticism Regarding Free Will
A Fundamental Source of Difficulty
The Significance of Free Will
Challenges to Free Will

Arguments for Incompatibilism

Alternative Possibilities
The Compatibility Question
Simple Arguments for Incompatibilism
Detailed Arguments
Compatibilist Replies
Conclusion

Compatibilist Arguments and Free Will Accounts

Positive Arguments for Compatibilism
Incompatibilist Replies
Compatibilist Conceptions of Freedom
New Directions

Varieties of Libertarianism

Libertarianism and Indeterminism
Competing Incompatibilist Accounts: T-1, A-C, and T-3 Theories
Undefeated Authorization of Preference
Challenges to the Proposed Indeterminist Model of Free Agency

The Concept of Moral Responsibility

The Function of Moral Responsibility Ascriptions
Accounts of Moral Responsibility
Conclusion

Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities

The Principle of Alternate Possibilities
The Failure of Frankfurt-Type Cases to Show the Falsity of PAP
Why PAP Is False
Incompatibilism Without PAP
Conclusion