Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Science features original essays on some of the most hotly debated issues in the field. Are there laws of social science? Are causes physically connected to their effects? Is the mind a system of modules shaped by natural selection? Eight central questions shape the volume, with each question treated by a pair of opposing essays. This distinctive format offers readers a unique opportunity to observe philosophers engaging in head-to-head debate. Together, the essays provide an accessible introduction to the major topics in contemporary philosophy of science, including empiricism, confirmation, realism, laws, causation, and explanation. Showcasing original arguments for well-defined positions, as well as clear and concise statements of sophisticated philosophical views, this volume is an excellent resource for professional philosophers and students alike.

Notes on Contributors
Preface
Introduction: What is the Philosophy of Science?
Do Thought Experiments Transcend Empiricism?
1.Why Thought Experiments Transcend Empiricism
2. Why Thought Experiments do not Transcend Empiricism
Does Probability Capture the Logic of Scientific Confirmation or Justification?
3. Probability Captures the Logic of Scientific Confirmation
4. Why Probability does not Capture the Logic of Scientific Justification
Can a Theory's Predictive Success Warrant Belief in the Unobservable Entities it Postulates?
5. A Theory's Predictive Success can Warrant Belief in the Unobservable Entities it Postulates
6. A Theory's Predictive Success does not Warrant Belief in the Unobservable Entities in Postulates
Are There Laws in the Social Sciences?
7. There are no Laws of the Social Sciences
8. There are Laws in the Social Sciences
Are Causes Physically Connected to their Effects?
9. Causes are Physically Connected to their Effects: Why Preventers and Omissions are not Causes
10. Causes need not be Physically Connected to their Effects: The Case for Negative Causation
Is there a Puzzle about the Low-Entropy Past?
11. On the Origins of the Arrow of Time: Why there is Still a Puzzle about the Low-Entropy Past
12. There is no Puzzle about the Low-Entropy Past
Do Genes Encode Information about Phenotypic Traits?
13. Genes Encode Information for Phenotypic Traits
14. Genes do not Encode Information for Phenotypic Traits
Is the Mind a System of Modules Shaped by Natural Selection?
15. The Mind is a System of Modules Shaped by Natural Selection
16. The Mind is not (just) a System of Modules Shaped (just) by Natural Selection