"This is an important book, simultaneously an original argument and a synthesis of a quarter-century of
work on legislative-executive relations. Using a variety of tools, ranging from juicy examples and toy models to
systematic empirical analysis and formal theory, Epstein and O�Halloran have crafted a persuasive approach to the
analysis of policy making in separation-of-powers regimes. It will surely influence the next generation of work."
--Kenneth A. Shepsle, Harvard University
Submitted by the Publisher, September, 2001
Summary
In this path-breaking book, David Epstein and Sharyn O'Halloran produce the first unified theory of policy making
between the legislative and executive branches. Examining major US policy initiatives from 1947 to 1992, the authors
describe the conditions under which the legislature narrowly constrains executive discretion, and when it delegates
authority to the bureaucracy. In doing so, the authors synthesize diverse and competitive literatures, from transaction
cost and principal-agent theory in economics, to information models developed in both economics and political science,
to substantive and theoretical work on legislative organization and on bureaucratic discretion.
Table of Contents
1. Paths of policy making
2. Choosing how to decide
3. Transaction cost politics
4. The decision to delegate
5. Data and postwar trends
6. Delegation and congressional-executive relations
7. Delegation and legislative organization
8. Delegation and issue areas
9. Conclusion
